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Michael W. Horn, the Appellant herein, by and through his
counsel, L. Zane Gill of the Law Office of L. Zane Gill, P.C.,
respectfully submits the following brief in reply to the
Appellees' Brief.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE APPELLANT'S PERCEIVED HANDICAP DISCRIMINATION CLAIM
WAS TIMELY FILED, THEREFORE, THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY
DISMISSED APPELLANT'S HANDICAP DISCRIMINATION CLAIM.

This Court should reverse the trial court's order dismissing
the Appellant's perceived handicap discrimination claim.

The

Appellant timely filed his perceived handicap discrimination
claim as the statute of limitations was tolled pursuant to the
discovery rule.
It is a well established principle that "[g]enerally, a
cause of action accrues 'upon the happening of the last event
necessary to complete the cause of action.'"
Langford,

Berenda

914 P.2d 45, 50 (Utah 1996) (quoting Myers

635 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah 1981)).

v.
v.

McDonald,

Nevertheless, "in certain

instances, the discovery rule "may operate to toll the period of
limitations until the discovery of facts forming the basis for
the cause of action.'11
Sal

Oil

Co.,

Id.

50-51 (quoting Walker

Drug Co. v. La

902 P.2d 1229, 1231 (Utah 1995) (citation omitted)).

As previously noted, there are three circumstances when the
discovery rule applies.

"The discovery rule applies when

mandated by statute, when a defendant has concealed a plaintiff's
cause of action, or when exceptional circumstances exist."
at 51 (citation omitted).

Id.

Finally, it is critical to note that
-1-

if the discovery rule does apply,

MX

the limitations period does

not begin to run until discovery of facts forming the basis for
the cause of action.'"
Services,

Id.

(quoting O'Neal

v. Division

of

Family

821 P.2d 1139, 1143 (Utah 1991) (citation omitted)).

Thus, in this case the statute of limitations would not begin to
run until the Appellant had learned of the facts comprising his
perceived handicap discrimination claim which was in July and
August of 1994.
In this case, the Appellant maintains that the discovery
rule should apply to prevent the running of the statute of
limitations pursuant to the concealment and exceptional
circumstances exceptions.

However, before the Court may consider

these exceptions, the party seeking protection of the discovery
rule must make an initial showing that the party "did not know
and could not reasonably have discovered the facts underlying the
cause of action in time to commence an action within that
period.11

Walker

Drug Co.,

Inc.

v.

La Sal

Oil

Co.,

902 P. 2d 1229,

1231 (Utah 1995) (citation omitted).
A.

Horn Did Not Know, Nor Could He Have Reasonably
Discovered The Facts Underlying His Discrimination
Cause Of Action.

The Appellees have argued that Horn should have discovered
the facts supporting this cause of action prior to the running of
the statute of limitations.

Brief of Appellees at 30.

The

Appellees proffer a laundry list of events which they contend
should have led Horn to discover that he was perceived as having a
mental disability.

The Appellees note that Horn recognized his
-2-

deteriorating relationship with his co-workers.
Appellant at 11.

Brief of

However, the deterioration of Horn's

relationship with his colleagues was directly linked to Horn's
participation in the RFP process.

R. 552-56, 527, 532-34.

Horn

objected to the illegal actions taken by his co-worker's and
insisted on strict compliance with the mandates of Utah law.
Horn's co-workers, however, had another agenda and Horn was only
complicating that agenda.

Thus, it is not unreasonable for Horn

not to perceive his deteriorating relationship with his
colleagues as an indication that he was being perceived as
mentally disabled.
Next, the internal affairs investigation that was conducted
regarding Horn was the direct result of complaints about him by
Appellee Ertel and the goings on in the RFP Committee.
548-554.

R. 508,

Ertel did not like Horn objecting to her actions during

the RFP process.

In fact, Horn was very unhappy with Ertel

changing his work product without his permission and with Ertel's
participation in activities that Horn considered to be illegal.
This caused dissension among these two individuals.

This

conflict between Horn and Ertel did not put Horn on notice that he
was perceived as having a mental disability by his supervisors
and peers.

In fact, it is unreasonable to assume that mere

antagonism between co-workers would lead one to believe that he
was being perceived as having a disability.
In addition, the fact that Horn was being overworked and was
suffering from the subsequent stress and pressure of this
-3-

exertion, does not mean that he should have known that he was
being perceived as having a mental disability.

Merely because

one may experience stress and pressure from work does not mean
that others perceive that individual as having a mental
disability.

It certainly is not unreasonable that this did not

indicate to Horn that his supervisors were perceiving him as an
individual with a mental disability.
The Appellees also maintain that Horn should have been aware
of the Appellees' perception of a mental disability because he
was banned from one of the floors in the building in which he
worked.

However, again, Horn perceived this ban as directly

related to his objections to the illegalities that were taking
place during the RFP process.

Horn perceived that he was being

retaliated against by those of whom he had complained.

R. 503.

Horn's belief in this regard was not unreasonable given the fact
that prior to the RFP process he had a good relationship with his
colleagues.

R. 552-56.

It was not until he started to point out

the improprieties and the illegalities that were taking place
during the RFP process that adverse actions were taken against
Horn.
The Appellees further argue that Horn should have known that
he was being perceived as mentally disturbed because Appellee
Squire had tape recorded a conversation between Squire and Horn.
It was not unreasonable for Horn not to take the tape recording as
a cue that he was being perceived as having a mental handicap.
The conversation that was taped took place after the disastrous
-4-

annual job run for which Squire wanted to lay total blame on Horn.
Horn and Squire had had a disagreement over how to proceed during
the annual job run.

R. 511-12, 499-517.

It simply does not

warrant the conclusion that an employee would understand that he
was being discriminated against on the basis of a perceived
mental disability because his supervisor tape records a
conversation between them.

And in this case, it was not

unreasonable that Horn did not reach such a conclusion.
As to the revocation of Horn's security clearance, again, it
was not unreasonable for Horn to believe that this took place as
retaliation for his vigorous participation in the RFP process or
in retaliation for the circumstances surrounding the failed
annual job run.

By this time, many adverse actions were being

taken against Horn.

It was not unreasonable for Horn to believe

that the revocation of his security clearance was just another
action being taken against him for his participation in the RFP
process.
Finally, when Horn met with Townsend he was trying to secure
information to process his grievance.

R. 514-15.

to dissuade Horn from prosecuting the grievance.

Townsend tried

R. 515.

Townsend, on the other hand, claims that he reassured Horn that he
would do all he could to assist Horn but that any information
needed to be obtained from Townsend. R. 603.
meeting that Townsend claims Horn cried.

It is during this

According to the

Appellees, this fact is supposed to have made Horn aware that he
was being perceived as mentally disturbed.
-5-

However, Townsend did

not refer Horn to counseling or help despite the existence of a
program for such assistance.

R. 618.

If Townsend had done so,

it would have been reasonable for Horn to know that he was being
perceived as mentally disabled.
None of the facts presented in the Appellees' laundry list
would establish that Horn knew of the pertinent facts underlying
his perceived handicap discrimination cause of action.

Nor does

this laundry list establish that Horn should have discovered the
underlying facts prior to the running of the statute of
limitations.

Moreover, even if these items had led Horn's counsel

to question Appellees during their depositions with regard to a
potential claim for disability discrimination, the facts
underlying the cause of action were not discovered until that
time.

"The limitations period is postponed only be belated

discovery of key facts and not by delayed discovery of legal
theories."

Anderson

v. Dean Witter

Reynolds,

579 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (citations omitted).

Inc.,

920 P.2d 575,

Horn did not

discover the facts underlying this cause of action until the
deposition testimony was secured in the summer of 1994.1

1

The Appellees also argue that the three reasons given
for Horn's termination should have put him on notice that he was
being terminated because of a perceived mental disability.
However, the three reasons given for Horn's termination (that Horn
was a security threat, that Horn had committed perjury, and that
Horn had been insubordinate), make no reference to the Appellees'
belief that Horn was mentally disturbed. See R. 492-93, 494-98.
Moreover, given the constant retaliation that Horn had suffered,
it was logical for him to understand that the reasons given were
tied to that retaliation and not that they were the result of
illegal discrimination against him.
-6-

Based on the foregoing, it is evident that Horn has
established the requisite threshold for consideration of the
fraudulent concealment and exceptional circumstances prongs of
the discovery rule.
B.

The Appellees Concealed Horn's Discrimination Cause
Of Action.

The discovery rule should be applied in this case because
the Appellees concealed Horn's discrimination cause of action.2
Here, the Appellees took affirmative steps to conceal the facts
underlying Horn's cause of action for perceived handicap
discrimination.

"In such a situation, a plaintiff can avoid the

full operation of the discovery rule by making a prima facie
showing of fraudulent concealment and then demonstrating that
given the Defendant's actions, a reasonable plaintiff would not
have discovered the claim earlier."
P.2d at 51 (citations omitted).

Berenda

v. Langford,

914

This

requires a determination of (i) when a plaintiff would
reasonably be on notice to inquire into a defendant's
wrongdoing despite the defendant's efforts to conceal it;
and (ii) whether a plaintiff, once on notice, would
reasonably have, with due diligence, discovered the facts
forming the basis of the cause of action despite the
defendant's efforts to conceal those facts.
Jd. at 52.

As the Berenda

not a simple as it seems.3

court noted, such a determination is
Id.

2

The Appellees failed to address the "exceptional
circumstances" prong of the discovery rule. The Appellant would
direct the Court's attention to his principle brief for argument
on this point.
3

The want of simplicity in these circumstances warrants a
reversal of summary judgment on this issue in this case:
-7-

Here the Appellees did affirmatively conceal that one of the
motivating factors for the adverse actions against Horn was a
perceived mental disability.

No reference was made to any such

perception in the notice of termination.

R. 492-93, 494-98.

Further, no indication of this discrimination was made evident in
the Appellant's discovery responses filed in the companion
federal case.

Moreover, the discovery responses were served upon

the Appellants on November 15, 1991.
Appellant.

See Addendum to Brief of

The Appellants did not file their responses to those

discovery requests until May 15, 1993, more than one and one-half
years later!

Further, the answers were only filed after Horn

sought the assistance of the court via a motion to compel.

These

answers did not set forth the facts which would support Horn's
cause of action, despite the fact that Horn requested that all
reasons for his termination be disclosed.

This concealment took

place despite the fact that the perceived mental disability was a
motivating factor, if not one of the primary reasons, for Horn's
termination.

R. 363, 494-98, 552-554, 588, 605.

Horn then

started the process to take the depositions of the critical
When a defendant has concealed a plaintiff's cause of
action, the questions of when a plaintiff should reasonably
begin inquiring about the defendant's wrongdoing and
whether, once on notice, the plaintiff has acted with
reasonable diligence to discover the facts forming the basis
of the cause of action are all highly fact-dependent legal
questions. ... we explicitly acknowledge that weighing the
reasonableness of the plaintiff's conduct in light of the
defendant's steps to conceal the cause of action
necessitates the type of factual findings which preclude
summary judgment in all but the clearest of cases.
Berenda

v. Langford,

914 P.2d at 53-54.
-8-

witnesses in the federal case.

Horn attempted to take the

critical depositions in November of 1993.

See Letter from L.

Zane Gill to Mark Ward dated October 12, 1993 attached in an
Addendum hereto.

The depositions did not take place at that time

in order to accommodate the Appellees and their counsel.

When

the depositions did take place, Horn finally discovered the
illegal discrimination on the part of the Appellees.

At this

point in time, Horn was put on inquiry that one of the grounds for
his termination was a perception that he was mentally disabled.
This was in July and August of 1994.

After completing further

investigation, Horn filed his amended complaint on March 6, 1995
adding a claim for perceived handicap discrimination.

This cause

of action was lodged with the court less than one year after its
discovery.

Thus, once put on notice of the possible existence of

a cause of action for perceived handicap discrimination, i.e.
"circumstances sufficient to put a reasonable person on
inquiry [,]" Horn was diligent in getting the matter before the
Court.4

Anderson v. Dean Witter

Reynolds,

4

Inc.

920 P.2d at 579

Hom's diligence is demonstrated by his efforts to move
his federal litigation forward. See Addendum to Brief of
Appellant. Horn timely filed his lawsuit. Horn submitted discovery
requests. Horn took the depositions of the critical witnesses.
Horn obtained a default judgment against the Appellees. If anyone
is to blame for the delay in the discovery of the facts
underlying Hom's discrimination cause of action, it is the
Appellees themselves. The Appellees took more than two years to
file an answer to Hom's complaint. The Appellees took an
inordinate amount of time to respond to Hom's discovery requests.
The Appellees failed to disclose all of the reasons for Hom's
termination. It was the Appellees' lack of diligence in this
matter that prevented Horn from learning the truth about his
termination. Horn should not be punished for the lack of
perseverance on the part of Appellees.
-9-

(citations omitted).
The trial court committed error when it found that the
discovery rule did not apply to toll the running of the statute
of limitations in this case.

Horn did not know, nor could he have

discovered the facts underlying his discrimination cause of
action in order to commence the action within the statutory time
period.

The Appellees concealed that they perceived Horn as

having a mental disability.

The Appellees further concealed that

this perception was one of the grounds for Horn's termination.
Horn only learned of the true motivations for his termination
during the deposition testimony of critical witnesses in July and
August 1994.

Upon being put on notice, Horn investigated and

promptly amended his complaint.

Therefore, this Court should

reverse the trial court's entry of summary judgment against Horn
on this issue.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY DISMISSED THE APPELLANT'S
CLAIMS FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT BECAUSE THE EMPLOYMENT
RELATIONSHIP WAS CONTRACTUAL IN NATURE.

It is Horn's contention that he was employed by the State of
Utah pursuant to an express contract the terms and conditions of
which were supplied by statute and rules and regulations.

These

written instruments comprise the express terms of Horn's
employment relationship with the State of Utah.

Thus, because

Horn's relationship is contractual rather than statutory, a six
year statute of limitations applies.

Horn's breach of contract

claim and his breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing claim were timely filed within that six year period.
-10-

The Appellees make reference to other jurisdictions who have
considered the issue now pending before this Court.

The cases

cited by the Appellees indicate that these jurisdictions have
concluded that public service employment is statutory and not
contractual.

However, as noted by all parties involved, this

precise issue has not been determined by the courts of this
state.
It is the Appellant's contention that a finding that the
nature of the relationship between the State and its civil
service employees as contractual would be logical and premised
upon existing precedent.

See e.g.

Thurston

v. Box Elder

County,

892 P.2d 1034 (Utah 1995) (affirming finding that the County had
breached its employment contract
City

Public

School

Teachers'

with Thurston); Newcomb v.

Retirement

Comm'n,

Ogden

243 P.2d 941

(Utah 1952) (recognizing that statutes and ordinances become part
of the employee's contract

of employment, i.e.

that they are

incorporated as terms and conditions of the contract of
employment between the public employer and the public employee).
Therefore, the Appellant respectfully requests that the Court, in
its careful consideration, rule that the character of the
relationship between a public employer and its "civil service"
employees is contractual in nature.
III. APPELLEES CANNOT RAISE EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES AS AN ALTERNATIVE GROUNDS FOR AFFIRMING THE
DISMISSAL, GIVEN THE FAILURE OF THE APPELLEES TO
PRESERVE THE ISSUE FOR APPEAL.
The Appellees raise the issue of the Appellant's failure to
exhaust his administrative remedies in their Brief of Appellees.
-11-

See

Brief of Appellees footnotes 3, 6, and page 25.

This issue

was not raised before the Court below, and therefore, this Court
is precluded form reviewing the Appellees' failure to exhaust
argument.
It is a well established principle of law that "a party must
raise an objection in an earlier proceeding or waive its right to
litigate the issue in subsequent proceedings."
Schwendiman,
11

Brinkerhoff

790 P.2d 587, 589 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

v.

In order

[t] o preserve a substantive issue for appeal, a party must first

raise the issue before the trial court."
County

Comm'n,

Hart

v. Salt

945 P. 2d 125, 129 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).

Lake
Such

issues must be raised before the trial court as it is the "proper
forum in which to commence thoughtful and probing analysis" of
State

issues.

v.

Bobo,

803 P.2d 1268, 1273 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

In fact, by failing to raise the issue below, the Appellees' have
f,

denie[d] the trial court

x

the opportunity to make any findings

of fact or conclusions of law' pertinent to the claimed error."
State

v. Brown,

LaBaron

& Assoc,

856 P.2d 358, 360 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (quoting
v. .Rebel Enter.,

823 P. 2d 479, 483 n. 6 (Utah

Ct. App. 1991)).
The principle of preservation for appeal has been examined
at length by Utah's appellate courts.
in Condas
Lake

v.

County

Condast
Comm'n,

Two examples can be found

618 P.2d 491 (Utah 1980) and Hart
945 P.2d 125 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).

v.

Salt

In

Condas,

certain statements of deceased witnesses were admitted at

trial.

On appeal, the party opposing the admission of these
-12-

statements argued that the other party had failed to offer proof
at trial that the witnesses were unavailable to testify.

The

Court rejected this argument and found that because the party had
failed to object to the admission of the statements at trial,
that the party had therefore waived its right to challenge the
issue on appeal.
In Hart,

Condas

v. Condas,

618 P.2d at 495.

the County raised an issue on appeal that was not

sufficiently presented to the trial court.

In Hart,

the County

argued on appeal that it did not owe a duty to Hart under the
public duty doctrine.

Hart argued that the issue had not been

preserved for appeal and therefore could not be considered by the
Court.

The County, however, argued that it had preserved the

issue by objecting to a particular jury instruction.5

In ruling

that the County had not preserved the issue for appeal, the Court
of Appeals noted that the County had objected to the jury
instruction on the basis insufficient evidence.

"Such an

objection is not sufficiently specific to raise the County's
argument that it did not owe Hart a duty because such an
objection would not raise the issue 'to a level of consciousness
such that the trial judge could consider it.'"
County

Comm'n,

945 P.2d at 130-31 (quoting State

Hart

v.

Salt

v. Brown,

Lake
856

P.2d 358, 361 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (citations omitted)).

5

The jury instruction specifically dealt with Hart's
allegations of negligence against the County and with what the
jury must find in order to return a verdict in favor of Hart.
Hart v. Salt Lake County Comm'n, 945 P.2d at 13 0.
-13-

With these principles and cases in mind, it is clear that
this Court should not consider the Appellees7 failure to exhaust
claim.

The Appellees' have not demonstrated where in the record

they preserved this issue below.6

Further, the Appellees have

not stated any basis for considering an unpreserved issue.
UTAH

R.

APP.

See

P. 24(a)(5)(B). Thus, the Court should not consider

the Appellees' exhaustion argument as an alternative grounds to
affirm the dismissal of the Appellant's complaint.
IV.

APPELLEES CANNOT ASSERT FAILURE TO FILE A NOTICE OF
CLAIM AS GROUNDS FOR AFFIRMING THE DISMISSAL BELOW.

In footnote 9 of their Brief of Appellees, the Appellees
assert an alternative ground for affirming the dismissal below.
The Appellees argue that the Appellant's claims are barred by the
Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
seq.

See

This argument is two pronged.

UTAH CODE ANN..

§§ 63-30-1

et

First, the Appellees

maintain that the Appellant failed to file a Notice of Claim.
This simply is not accurate.

Not only did the Appellant file a

6

The Appellees make a token mention of exhaustion in their
reply memorandum in support of their motion for summary judgment.
However, this mention does not refer to the Appellant's case nor
does it rise to the level necessary that the trial court was
afforded the opportunity to rule on the issue. In order for the
trial court to have been afforded the opportunity to rule on this
issue, several things must be demonstrated. "First, the issue
must be raised in a timely fashion. ... Second, the issue must be
specifically raised, ... such that the issue is sufficiently
raised to a xlevel of consciousness' before the trial court[. ]
... Third, the party must introduce to the trial court
'supporting evidence or relevant legal authority; to support its
argument." Hart v. Salt Lake County Comm'n, 945 P.2d at 130
(citations omitted).
The Appellees did not accomplish any of these requirements
and this court should decline to further address the Appellees'
exhaustion argument.
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Notice of Claim, but said Notice of Claim was specifically denied
by the State of Utah.

R. 1087-1111, 1086.

Second, the Appellees

argue that immunity has not been waived as to the circumstances
of this case.

As with the Appellees' exhaustion argument, this

argument was not preserved for appeal.
parties never briefed this issue.7

See

Point III supra.

The

Thus, this Court should

decline to consider this issue in any fashion whatsoever.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing and on the arguments presented in
the Brief of Appellant, the Appellant respectfully requests that
this Court reverse the decision of the trial court and that this
Court remand this case back to the trial court for a trial on the
+

merits.

DATED AND RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this U? *

day of March,

1998.

7

In fact, it was not until shortly before trial in this
case that the Appellees deemed the employment relationship in
this case to be statutory rather than contractual. Indeed, the
Appellees had acknowledged that the Appellant's employment
relationship with the Department of Public Safety was
contractual. Thus, there was never a question of whether
immunity had been waived or not.
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mail, postage prepaid, upon the following:
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P.O. Box 140856
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ADDENDUM

FAX TRANSMITTAL FORM

Law Office of L. Zane Gill
215 South State Street, Suite 545
Salt Lake City, Utah 8 4 1 1 1
Telephone:(801) 355-2600
FAX: (801) 355-2606

TO: J . Mark Ward
FROM: L. Zane Gill

/

^ ^

DATE: October 12, 1993
SUBJECT: Horn v. Squires et all - Deposition Schedule
FAX SENT TO THIS NUMBER: 530-4916

Message:
I have tried to reach you and you have tried to get back to me. At least with
this message you will know what I want.
I propose to take the following depositions at the times and dates indicated.
Call me to adjust schedules. I will be on my honeymoon from Friday, October 15,
1993 through Monday, October 25, 1993. As for your taking Mr. Horn's deposition,
he is very concerned that his taking any time during the normal work week will cost
him his j o b . He is in New Mexico and might be able to come to Salt Lake on a
weekend to have his depo taken. I can work with that if it is OK w i t h you.
We will most likely need to submit a stipulation or letter to the judge to make
him aware that w e are spilling over the discovery cut off date.

Michael Horn v. Squires et al.
Deposition List
Notice Only:
1.

Roland Squires

4hrs

4

2.

A r t Hudachko

4hrs

5

3.

Douglas Bordrero

4hrs

6

1.

Rich Townsend

2hrs

7

2.

Judy Sorensen (?)

3.

Sheri Stark

2hrs

9

4.

Cheri Ertel

4hrs

1

5.

Bart Blackstock

3hrs

8

6.

Harold Carpenter (?)

7.

Kuang-Po Lee

4hrs

2

8.

Dan Taylor

2hrs

3

Subpoena:

?

?

» * * • # » * * * • * # # * » » * * # »

3 1/2 days
Available Days:
November 3

Ertel am

Lee pm

November 4

Taylor am Squires am

November 5 pm

Hudachko

November 8

Bordrero am Townsend pm Blackstock pm

November 9

Stark am

November nJ
November 11
November
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TIME
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CASTLE GILL OFFICE

FAX

8013552806
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